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Abstract
In the “divide a dollar” framework of distributive politics among
three pivotal groups of unequal size, the paper compares two variants
of two-party competition, the objective of a party being the probability
of winning (“Majority Tournament” game) or the expected number of
votes (“Plurality” game). At a mixed equilibrium, all individuals are,
on expectation, treated alike in the Plurality Game while the Tourna-
ment Game favors individuals in small groups.
1 Introduction
In basic models of two-party Downsian political competition, maximizing the
number of vote (the “plurality”) or trying to win the election by whatever
margin (the “majority tournament”) are equivalent objectives for the parties
in the sense that they lead to the same equilibria. But the equivalence result
is often lost in richer models that take into account abstention, uncertainty,
or a non-trivial decision structure for parties.
The hypothesis that parties maximise the expected number of votes
rather than the probability of winning usually (but not always) gives rise
to more mathematically tractable models; for that reason, as noticed by
Coughlin, 1992 [11], “In most of the Public Choice literature, it is assumed
that each candidate wants to maximize his expected plurality”. A notable
exception is Roemer (see 2001, [29]) for whom the “probability of winning”
hypothesis is important. It may be the case that specific models can be
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interpreted in one way or another, like for instance, the model of Aragones
and Palfrey, 2002 [1].
The equivalence result is very sensitive to various kind of uncertainty.
Uncertainty in electoral competition may arise from exogenous reasons such
that parties having imperfect information on the voters’ preferences or tech-
nical impossibility to communicate with the voters without noise. Uncer-
tainty may moreover come out for endogenous strategic reasons.
Models of imperfect information in Politics are surveyed by Banks, 1991
[5], where instances can be found in which payoﬀs are uncertain, be it for
exogenous or endogenous reasons. According to the Condorcetian philoso-
phy, gathering information in an uncertain world is one reason of being for
democratic institutions, as expressed in the Condorcet Jury theorem. The
“Jury” framework is used by Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996 [2] to discuss in
a modern fashion information aggregation by direct voting. With the same
framework, Laslier and Van der Straeten, 2003 [22] discuss information ag-
gregation by electoral competition and the equivalence problem.
The equivalence problem is studied with great details by Patty, 1999, and
Duggan, 2000, [27, 12] in “probabilistic voting” models. Here the uncertainty
about the number of votes to be received by a party derives from a random
noise added to each voter’s utility function and the probability distribution
of this noise is exogenous.
The question of endogenous strategic uncertainty is of particular impor-
tance because electoral competition games usually have no pure strategy
equilibria (the book Austen-Smith and Banks, 1999 [3], contains a modern
survey of the “chaos” theorems of McKelvey, Schofield, and others). The
question is thus raised of the mixed strategy equilibria of these games.
Laﬀond, Laslier and Le Breton, 1994 [15] give a simple example with a fi-
nite set of alternatives in which the Majority Tournament game and the Plu-
rality game each have unique equilibria and the two equilibria are completely
diﬀerent. Dutta and Laslier, 1999 [13] provide a more detailed comparison
of the social choice correspondences based on the Majority Tournament and
the Plurality. Laslier, 2000 [18] proposes an unusual interpretation of mixed
strategies in these specific games. There are two standard interpretations
for the mixed strategy probability p(x) associated to a proposed alternative
x. (i) Random choice: p(x) is the probability that the party chooses x at
random. (ii) Belief: p(x) is the belief of the other party as to the choice of
x. In electoral competition games, one can furthermore interpret p(x) as the
fraction of the electorate who judges the party according to proposition x, or
probability that a voter understands that the party will implement x. The
equilibrium of the electoral competition under this third interpretation can
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curiously be the equilibrium of the payoﬀ matrix of the Plurality game even
if the parties maximise the probability of winning1 This is a theoretical point
in favor of the “Plurality” model and against the “Majority Tournament”
one.
Another point in favor of the Plurality model is that it has a natural
extension to the case of more than two parties, under the “Borda electoral
competition”, even in the presence of a mixed equilibrium (Laﬀond, Laslier
and LeBreton, 2000 [16]. Laslier, 2003 [20] studies the robustness of mixed
strategy equilibria in electoral competition with respect to the voters dislik-
ing ambiguity and the parties prudent behavior.
On economic domains, mixed strategy equilibria are usually hard to com-
pute. Technical diﬃculties abound, no general existence theorem is avail-
able, and the inclusion of the support of optimal strategies in the uncovered
set, which is easy to prove in the finite setting, is no longer a trivial matter
(see McKelvey, 1986, Banks, Duggan and Le Breton, 2002 [23, 6]).
One important economic model, which serves as a benchmark in Social
Choice Theory and Formal Political Science, is the “Divide a dollar” model.
When voting is not mediated by parties, Banks and Gasmi, 1987, and Penn,
2002 [7, 28] have studied the three-voter divide a dollar game, following
the ideas developed in the “sophisticated voting” literature (see the survey
Miller, 1995 [24]) which led to the definition of the “Banks set” (Banks, 1985
[4]).
When voting is mediated by parties, the “Divide a dollar” model is
equivalent to a problem of strategic resource allocation that has been studied
by game theorists (Borel, 1938, Gross and Wagner, 1950, Owen, 1982 [8, 14,
26]). It is used in Political Science as a model of pure redistributive politics
in order to study the question of the treatment of minorities by democratic
rules (Myerson, 1993, Laslier and Picard, 2002, Laslier, 2002 [25, 21, 19]).
The present paper considers the following “Divide a dollar” framework:
A fixed amount of money has to be divided among three groups of individuals
of unequal size. I exhibit a mixed strategy equilibrium for the associated
Tournament game and compare it with the mixed strategy equilibrium for
the associated Plurality game that is studied in Laslier, 2002 [19]. The
optimal strategy for the Plurality game always treats individuals in the
same way, whatever group they belong to; but the optimal strategy for the
Tournament game treats better the individuals belonging to small groups.
To highlight the diﬀerence, I further consider the situation with two large
1The key point is here: do the various voters judge a party fuzzy proposal independently
the ones from the others?
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groups of equal size and one small “pivotal” group. By computing expected
values for two indices of inequality (variance and Gini index) I show that the
optimal strategy of the Tournament game generates more inequality than
the one of the Plurality game.
The paper is organized as follows: after this introduction, section 2
presents the model. Section 3 describes optimal strategies and contains the
statement (proposition 8) about the shares received by individuals in diﬀer-
ent groups. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of inequality in the case of
one small pivotal group. Section 5 is a short conclusion.
2 The model
The population N is formed of n individuals and is partitioned in 3 groups
Ni, i = 1, 2, 3. There are ni individuals in group Ni :
N =
3[
i=1
Ni,
3X
i=1
ni = n.
The partition (N1, N2,N3) contains a majority if there exists an i such that
ni ≥ n/2; the majority is strict if the previous inequality is strict.
A quantity Q ∈ IR++ of money must be divided among the N individuals
but individuals belonging to the same group must receive the same amount.
Let xi be the amount received by an individual in group i, the set of possible
outcomes is:
∆(Q) = {x ∈ IR3+ :
3X
i=1
nixi = Q}.
For two outcomes x, y ∈ ∆(Q) the net plurality for x against y can be written:
g(x, y) =
3X
i=1
nisgn(xi − yi),
where, for any number t ∈ IR, sgn(t) equals −1 if t < 0, 0 if t = 0 and +1
if t > 0. Call Plurality Game the two-player, symmetric, zero-sum game
defined by g. The net plurality g(x, y) is the gain for the strategy x against
strategy y. A mixed strategy is a regular probability distribution on ∆(Q);
if p and q are two mixed strategies the payoﬀ to p against q is:
g(p, q) =
Z
x∈X
Z
y∈X
g(x, y)dp(x)dq(y),
4
That is the expected margin of votes.
For two outcomes x, y ∈ ∆(Q) the net majority for x against y is by
definition +1 if a majority of individuals prefer x to y, −1 in the opposite
case, and 0 in case of a tie. It can be written:
m(x, y) = sgn[g(x, y)] = sgn
"
3X
i=1
nisgn(xi − yi)
#
.
The two-player, symmetric, zero-sum game defined by m is called the
Majority Tournament Game or simply the Tournament Game. The net
majority m(x, y) ∈ {−1, 0,+1} is the payoﬀ for the strategy x against the
strategy y. If p and q are two mixed strategies the payoﬀ to p against q is:
m(p, q) =
Z
x∈X
Z
y∈X
m(x, y) dp(x) dq(y)
= Pr
p⊗q
[g(x, y) > 0]− Pr
p⊗q
[g(x, y) < 0] ,
If ties can be neglected, that is if p⊗ q [g(x, y) = 0] = 0, then m(p, q) is, up
to constants, equal to the probability of winning.
3 Optimal strategies
The two games considered in this paper are zero-sum, therefore the solution
concept ismin-max equilibrium. Recall that, in a zero-sum game with payoﬀ
function g, one defines the value for player 1, or “gain-floor” as:
v1 = max
p
min
q
g(p, q).
The symmetric definition for player 2 is v2 = maxqminp (−g(p, q)) and it is
easy to see that:
v2 = −min
q
max
p
g(p, q).
The values for the two players are well-defined numbers, provided for in-
stance that the payoﬀ function is bounded, and are such that v1 + v2 ≤ 0.
If v1 + v2 = 0, which also writes: maxpminq g(p, q) = minqmaxp g(p, q),
one simply says that v1 is the value of the game. According to von Neu-
mann’s min-max theorem, finite games in mixed strategies have a value, but
infinite games may have no value, even in mixed strategies. A strategy p∗
for player 1 is optimal if
min
q
g(p∗, q) = max
p
min
q
g(p, q) = min
q
max
p
g(p, q);
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that is: p∗ is optimal if the game has a value and p∗ guarantees this value
to player 1. The definition is symmetric for the other player. A min-max
equilibrium is a pair of optimal strategies2. When the game is symmetric,
that is if both players have the same strategy set and g(x, y) = −g(y, x),
optimal strategies, when they exist, are obviously the same for both players
and the value of the game can only be 0. (All games in the present paper
are symmetric.)
3.1 Cases with pure strategy equilibrium
It is a standard result that, in pure strategies, the two objectives for parties
(Plurality or Majority) are equivalent.
Proposition 1 The Plurality and Tournament games have the same opti-
mal pure strategies.
But a pure equilibrium appears only when the partition contains a ma-
jority; more precisely, Laslier, 2002 [19], notices:
Proposition 2 (i) If the partition of the population contains a strict ma-
jority then each party has a unique optimal strategy. This strategy is pure,
it consists in giving all the money to the largest group.
(ii) The same result holds if one group contains exactly half of the pop-
ulation and there are at least two other groups.
(iii) If the partition is (N1, N2) with n1 = n2 = n/2 then any strategy is
optimal.
Proposition 3 If the partition of the population contains no majority then
no pure strategy is optimal, and the Plurality Game as well as the Tourna-
ment Game have no pure strategy equilibrium.
3.2 Cases with no pure strategy equilibrium
We now turn to the cases where no pure strategy equilibrium exists. None
of the three groups is a majority:
n = n1 + n2 + n3
0 < n1 ≤ n2 ≤ n3 < n/2.
2See Owen, 1982 [26] for an introduction to the theory of zero-sum games. For these
games, a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if and only if each player’s strategy is
optimal.
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Figure 1: Representing divisions by heights in a triangle
The set ∆(Q) of possible divisions can then be represented as a triangle
(A1, A2, A3) with sides A1A2 = n3, A2A3 = n1, A3A1 = n2. For a point
M inside the triangle, let Hi, i = 1, 2, 3, be the projections of M on the
sides, as in Figure 1. Then for any M ,
P3
i=1 niMHi = 2S, where S is the
surface of (A1, A2, A3). Changing the unit of money so that Q = 2S, we can
represent any division of Q by a point M . The height MHi is the amount
of money that each individual in group i gets.
We look for optimal strategies in the Tournament Game and in the
Plurality Game. We now define a strategy that will prove to be optimal
for the Tournament Game:
Definition 4 (An optimal strategy for the Tournament Game) Let
ϕ and θ be two independent random variables such that ϕ has density (1/2) sinϕ
on [0,π] and θ is uniform on [0, 2π]. Let for i = 1, 2, 3 :
ai = (1/3) (1− sinϕ cos(θ − 2iπ/3)) .
Let p∗ma be the probability distribution of the variable (x1, x2, x3) with:
xi =
aiQ
ni
.
Proposition 5 With three groups, p∗ma is an optimal strategy for the Tour-
nament Game.
Proof. With probability one, x ∈ ∆(Q). Consider a pure strategy
x0 ∈ ∆(Q),
m(p∗ma, x
0) = E
"
3X
i=1
sgn(xi − x0i)
#
.
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The events such that {xi = x0i} have probability 0, thus the only case to
be distinguished are of the form “two groups against one”. Therefore the
payoﬀ of p∗ma against x
0 in the Tournament game is3:
m(p∗ma, x
0) =
X
i,j,k
Pr
£
xi > x
0
i and xj > x
0
j and xk < x
0
k
¤
−
X
i,j,k
Pr
£
xi < x
0
i and xj < x
0
j and xk > x
0
k
¤
.
where the sum
P
i,j,k goes over suitable distinct indices i, j, k = 1, 2, 3.
The random variable a = (a1, a2, a3) has the property that
P3
i=1 ai = 1
and, for i = 1, 2, 3, ai is uniform on [0, 2/3]. From this, one can easily infer
that:
∀a0 ∈ ∆3, Ea
"
3X
i=1
sgn(ai − a0i)
#
≥ 0
where Ea denotes expectation, here with respect to the probability distrib-
ution of a. (See Laslier and Picard, 2002 [21]).Write a0i =
x0ini
Q , and notice
that xi > x0i is equivalent to ai > a
0
i, it follows that
m(p∗ma, x
0) =
X
i,j,k
Pr
£
ai > a
0
i and aj > a
0
j and ak < a
0
k
¤
−
X
i,j,k
Pr
£
ai < a
0
i and aj < a
0
j and ak > a
0
k
¤
= E
"
3X
i=1
sgn(ai − a0i)
#
≥ 0
Thus we proved that the mixed strategy p∗ma has non-negative payoﬀ against
any pure strategy. In a symmetric and zero-sum game, this is suﬃcient to
prove that p∗ma is optimal.
To illustrate, Pictures 2 shows 1000 draws according to the probability
distribution p∗ma. The support is an ellipse, with more weight on the border
than in the center region. In the case of the Plurality Game, Laslier, 2002
[19], exhibits an optimal strategy that can be compared with p∗ma, and that
can be described geometrically.
Definition 6 (An optimal stategy for the Plurality Game) In the tri-
angle (A1, A2, A3), consider the inscribed circle and a hemisphere erected
3This is the point where the proof given here is only valid for three groups.
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A1 A2
A3
Figure 2: Draws from an optimal strategy for the tournament game
over that circle (see picture 3). Choose a point R at random uniformly on
the hemisphere and denote by M the projection of R on the plane that con-
tains A1, A2, A3 (see picture 4). Let p∗pl be the probability distribution of the
variable (y1, y2, y3) with
yi =MHi.
Proposition 7 With three groups, p∗pl is an optimal strategy for the Plural-
ity Game.
From the properties of the strategies p∗ma and p
∗
pl, one immediately de-
duces the following proposition.
Proposition 8 With three groups:
• (Tournament Game) According to the optimal strategy p∗ma, the indi-
vidual share in group i is uniform on [0, 2Q3ni ]. On average, all groups
receive the same amount and individual belonging to smaller groups
receive more.
• (Plurality Game) According to the optimal strategy p∗pl, the individual
share in group i is uniform on [0, 2Qn ]. On average, all individuals
receive the same amount.
Picture 4, to be compared with Picture 2, shows 1000 draws according
to the probability distribution p∗pl. The support is now a circle, again with
more weight on the border than in the center region.
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A1
A2
Figure 3: Hemisphere erected over the inscribed cercle
A1 A2
A3
Figure 4: Draws from an optimal strategy for the plurality game
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4 A small pivotal group
In order to underline the diﬀerence of between the two games, consider the
following example: there are two groups of large, identical, size and one
small “pivotal” group. For an overall population of size 1 and for a pivotal
group of size e ∈]0, 1/3],
n1 = n2 = (1− e)/2
n3 = e.
Looking at Pictures 2 and 4, one can hint that, as e gets close to zero,
the support for the Tournament case looks like a long and flat ellipse while
the support for the plurality case looks like a small circle. The two cases
are thus obviously very diﬀerent for the small group. It seems that, because
the individuals in the small group occasionally get a large share, the Tour-
nament case generates more inequality than the plurality case. This section
shows that the intuition is right, despite the fact that the number of favored
individuals vanishes as e gets small. To do so, two indices of inequality are
considered: the variance and the Gini index.
4.1 Inequality according to the variance
In order to be able to make comparisons for diﬀerent values of c, we consider
that the amount of money to be divided is 1, therefore the amount that an
individual gets in group i is xi = hi/(2S), where hi is the height and S is
the surface of the triangle:
S = (1/4) e
√
1− 2e.
The variance at point M is:
var(M) =
3X
i=1
nix
2
i − 1.
Proposition 9 Expected value of the variance:
• (Tournament Game) According to the optimal strategy p∗ma :
E∗ma [var] =
4
27e
+
16
27 (1− e) − 1.
It thus tends to +∞ when the size e of the pivotal group tends to 0.
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• (Plurality Game) According to the optimal strategy p∗pl :
E∗pl [var] = 1/3.
Proof. According to proposition 8, for p∗ma, the individual share is
uniform between 0 and 2Q3ni =
2
3ni
, therefore:
E∗ma [var] =
3X
i=1
ni
1
3
µ
2
3ni
¶2
− 1 =
3X
i=1
4
27ni
− 1
=
4
27 (1− e) /2 +
4
27 (1− e) /2 +
4
27e
− 1
=
16
27 (1− e) +
4
27e
− 1.
Likewise, for p∗pl, the individual share is uniform between 0 and
2Q
n = 2,
therefore:
E∗pl [var] =
3X
i=1
ni
4
3
− 1 = 1
3
.
4.2 Inequality according to the Gini index
When the shares have been ordered x(1) ≤ x(2) ≤ x(3), the Gini index is
given by the following formula:
gini(M) = 1− 2

 n(1)
³
n(1)x(1)
2
´
+ n(2)
³
2n(1)x(1)+n(2)x(2)
2
´
+n(3)
³
2n(1)x(1)+2n(2)x(2)+n(3)x(3)
2
´ 
which can be written in a more convenient way:
gini(M) = 1−
³
n2(1) + 2n(1)n(2) + 2n(1)n(3)
´
x(1)
−
³
n2(2) + 2n(2)n(3)
´
x(2) − n2(3)x(3)
Proposition 10 Expected value of the Gini index when e is small:
• (Tournament Game) Let E∗ma [gini] denote the expected value, accord-
ing to p∗ma, of the Gini index,
lim
e→0
E∗ma [gini] =
4 +
√
3
12
' .48
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• (Plurality Game) Let E∗pl [gini] denote the expected value, according to
p∗pl, of the Gini index,
lim
e→0
E∗pl [gini] = .25
Proof. (i) For the Tournament game.
I will prove the stronger result that, when e is small, the expected value,
according to p∗ma, of the Gini index is approximately:
E∗ma [gini] '
4 +
√
3− (12 +
√
3)e
12
.
Following the definition (4) of p∗ma, one writes:
x1 =
2
3 (1− e) (1− sinϕ cos(θ − 2π/3))
x2 =
2
3 (1− e) (1− sinϕ cos(θ + 2π/3)) (1)
x3 =
1
3e
(1− sinϕ cos θ)
The Gini index is a piecewise aﬃne function of x1, x2, x3, depending on
how they are ordered. First notice that, because of the symmetry between
groups 1 and 2, one can compute expected values conditionally on x1 ≤ x2.
E∗ma [gini] = 2
Z
{x1≤x2}
gini(M) dp∗ma.
From (1), x1 ≤ x2 if and only if cos(θ − 2π/3) ≥ cos(θ + 2π/3), which is
equivalent to 0 ≤ θ ≤ π.
A Claim
As a second point, I claim that, according to p∗ma, the probability of the
event x3 > x1, x2 tends to one when e tends to zero. To check that point,
one studies the inequality x3 > x2, which writes equivalently:
1
3e
(1− sinϕ cos θ) > 2
3 (1− e) (1− sinϕ cos(θ + 2π/3))
1− 3e > ((1− e) cos θ − 2e cos(θ + 2π/3)) sinϕ
1− 3e >
³
(1− e) cos θ − e
h
− cos θ −
√
3 sin θ
i´
sinϕ
1− 3e >
³
cos θ + e
√
3 sin θ
´
sinϕ.
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Since 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ π, one can see that the inequality holds as soon as
1− 3e > cos θ + e
√
3 sin θ. (2)
Studying the function cos θ + e
√
3 sin θ for θ ∈ [0,π], one finds that (2) is
equivalent to:
θ > θ(e) = arc cos
1− 3e− 3e
p
2e (1− e)
1− 3e2 .
Recall that the random variable θ is uniform on [0,π]; since θ(e) tends to 0
with e, the probability of the event θ > θ(e) tends to 1 when e tends to 0.
The claim follows.
An aﬃne approximation
As a consequence, the expected value of the bounded function gini on the
event x1 ≤ x2 is approximately equal to the expected value of the function
that coincides with gini on the event x1 ≤ x2 ≤ x3. Letggini(M) = 1− ¡n21 + 2n1n2 + 2n1n3¢x1 − ¡n22 + 2n2n3¢x2 − n23x3,
then
lim
e→0
Z
{x1≤x2}
h
gini(M)− ggini(M)i dp∗ma = 0.
One can write:
2
Z
{x1≤x2}
ggini(M) dp∗ma = 2Z π
θ=0
Z π
ϕ=0
ggini(M) f(ϕ, θ) dϕ dθ
where f is the density:
f(ϕ, θ) =
1
4π
sinϕ.
The expression ggini can be simplified given the expressions of ni :
ggini(M) = 1− (1− e) (3 + e)
4
x1 −
(1− e) (1 + 3e)
4
x2 − e2x3
Final computations
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The integral to be computed is thus:
2
Z
{x1≤x2}
ggini(M) dp∗ma
= 2
Z π
θ=0
Z π
ϕ0
ggini(M) sinϕ
4π
dϕ dθ
=
Z π
0
Z π
0
1
sinϕ
2π
dϕ dθ
−(1− e) (3 + e)
4
Z π
0
Z π
0
x1
sinϕ
2π
dϕ dθ
−(1− e) (1 + 3e)
4
Z π
0
Z π
0
x2
sinϕ
2π
dϕ dθ
−e2
Z π
0
Z π
0
x3
sinϕ
2π
dϕ dθ.
Substituting x:
=
Z π
0
Z π
0
1
sinϕ
2π
dϕ dθ
−(6 + 2e)
12
Z π
0
Z π
0
(1− sinϕ cos(θ − 2π/3)) sinϕ
2π
dϕ dθ
−(2 + 6e)
12
Z π
0
Z π
0
(1− sinϕ cos(θ + 2π/3)) sinϕ
2π
dϕ dθ
−e
3
Z π
0
Z π
0
(1− sinϕ cos θ) sinϕ
2π
dϕ dθ.
Integrating with respect to θ:
= π
Z π
ϕ=0
sinϕ
2π
dϕ
−(6 + 2e)
12
Z π
0
³
π −
√
3 sinϕ
´ sinϕ
2π
dϕ
−(2 + 6e)
12
Z π
0
³
π +
√
3 sinϕ
´ sinϕ
2π
dϕ
−e
3
Z π
0
π
sinϕ
2π
dϕ.
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Integrating with respect to ϕ :
= 1− e
3
−(3 + e)
12
Ã
2−
√
3
2
!
−(1 + 3e)
12
Ã
2 +
√
3
2
!
,
and the result follows.
(ii) For the Plurality Game
The disk solution (definition 6) p∗pl in that case can be defined by the
equations:
x1 = r (1 + sinϕ cos(θ + α))
x2 = r (1 + sinϕ cos(θ − α)) (3)
x3 = r (1− sinϕ cos θ) ,
where r is the radius of the inscribed circle, α is the angle at A1 (or A2),
r =
1
2
e
√
1− 2e,
cosα =
e
1− e,
and ϕ and θ are two independent random variables such that ϕ has density
(1/2) sinϕ on [0,π] and θ is uniform on [0, 2π]. This is easily seen graphically
(picture ??): C the center of the inscribed circle, H = (A1 + A2)/2 is the
foot of A3, θ is the angle between the vectors
−−→
CH and
−−→
CM , and r sinϕ is
the distance CM . Then, if H1 is the projection ofM on the side A2A3, with
x1 =MH1, one gets by considering the projection P of C on MH1:dHCP = π
2
− α, dHCM = θ,dCMH1 = θ + α,
MH1 = PH1 +CM cos (θ + α)
= r + r sinϕ cos(θ + α).
There is no simpler way to write down equations (3), but the regions of
integration, for computing the expected Gini index are very simple:
for 0 < θ < π/2− α , x3 < x1 < x2
for π/2− α < θ < π/2 + α , x1 < x3 < x2
for π/2 + α < θ < π , x1 < x2 < x3
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Figure 5: Construction for the proof of propopsition 10
and so on...
On each of these regions, integrating the Gini index with respect to the
density 14π sinϕ is a long but straightforward computation, suitable for a
symbolic computation software. Using Mathematica, one obtains that the
expected value, according to p∗pl, of the Gini index is :
E∗pl [var] =
√
1− 2e
·
1− 2e2
1− e
¸
/4 +
e√
2− 2e
·
1− 2e+ 2e2
1− e
¸
/4
therefore:
lim
e→0
E∗pl [var] = .25
5 Conclusion
In a redistributive problem among three groups of unequal size, this paper
showed that at a mixed equilibrium of the two-party electoral competition,
all voters are, on expectation, treated symmetrically in the Plurality Game
while the Tournament Game favors individuals in small groups. In this
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model, the Downsian competition is predicted to generate more or less in-
equality depending on an assumption on parties’ objective, more inequality
arising if parties do not care about their margin of victory.
One may wonder about the possibility that the “party objective” ques-
tion be settled by observation. To that end, one would need diﬀerentiated
testable predictions based on the kind of models proposed in the present
paper. In the 70’s, several scholars, following Brams and Davis, 1974 [9],
tried to relate the amount spent during their campaign by presidential can-
didates in the diﬀerent States in the USA, to the size of the States. Brams
and Davis, used a “Plurality” objective and derive the conclusion that re-
sources are allocated proportionally to the power 3/2 of the electoral vote.
Lake, 1979 [17] used a “probability of winning” objective and found that
candidates should spend a disproportionately large amount of their funds
in large states. These analyses use a “local equilibrium” approach which
is not totally satisfying, and the conformity of observations with prediction
has been disputed (see Colantoni, Levesque and Ordeshook, 1975 [10], and
the exchanges that followed; see also Young, 1978 [30]).
My opinion is that there is little hope, when trying to figure out what
is the true objective of a party, to find a simple answer of the form “par-
ties maximise the expected plurality and not the probability of winning”,
and this for two reasons. One obvious reason is that a party is not a single
decision-maker but a complex organization whose members have diﬀerent
goals: winning the next election, but also winning other elections, promot-
ing ideas, representing some part of the electorate, etc. Another reason is
the following: When we simplify things to a point where parties are “Down-
sian” and the party objective is one of the two objectives under scrutiny,
we are often confronted with mixed strategy equilibria, whose predictions
are diﬃcult to test. I therefore submit that the main thing we need is to
better understand the nature of political competition in the absence of a
Condorcet winner policy, which includes understanding how can a party be-
have in front of the voters when the party has no pure optimal strategy. I
suspect that a key point here is to deepen our theoretical knowledge of the
communication process that takes place between a candidate and a voter.
Thus the “party objective problem” is probably a case in point where we
are in need of theory before observations.
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